Looking back on his heedless youth as an aspiring merchant-adventurer,
drowning offthe Norfolk coast. Early in his narrative, he contends that there is perhaps some sort of fate (and the lack of certainty is interesting, pointing to the controversy surrounding the issue of particular Providence at the time), a "secret over-ruling decree that hurries us on to be the instruments of our own destruction."1 Crusoe's life story is, among other things, his attempt to resolve various problems in human destiny and behaviour as they were formulated for many in the early eighteenth century, with their mixture of agency and complicated compulsion, that his individual (if extraordinary) life illustrates. His richly rendered particular story in many ways gestures consistently and self-consciously towards the exploration of general issues and ideas, some of them-such as Crusoe's intelligently thorough debate with himself about his moral relationship to the cannibal visitors-much more far-reaching in their general application than musings on the nature of his individual destiny and personal psychology.
Intensely and coherently at such moments as the cannibal debate (to which I return later), Robinson Crusoe is as much what we would nowadays call a novel of ideas as of personal experience, and its intense realistic particularity consistently moves towards general implications, or we might want to say that the particular and the general are productively intertwined in Defoe's narrative. From the outset, Cmsoe is reflective and articulate;
he examines and argues any number of controversial positions about individual destiny and personal agency. He is a good deal of the time nothing less than an essayist, a thoughtful and polemical controversialist, which is hardly surprising given Defoe's own identity and experience as both for most of his life. Of course, there is nothing like total solitude to make one thoughtful, and Crusoe's mind is forced by isolation towards intellectual exertions, but it can be argued, as many have done, that Crusoe's isolation is simply a literal version of the thoughtful and individualistic apartness that defines the novelistic sensibility. Indeed, Defoe in all his longer narratives is a proto-novelist and instructive precursor of his mid-century successors precisely by virtue of this attention to ideas and arguments and by the essayistic fluency and intellectual curiosity that he lends his thoughtful narrators, isolated and therefore even more intensely thoughtful as they look back on their lives. This is not to say that his evocation of their personalities, of individualized speaking voices formed by exactly rendered personal experiences, is not the crucial factor in Defoe's status as a writer of imaginative fictions. Rather, it is to say that the eighteenth-century English novel as we tend to trace its full flowering in the 1740s and after needs to be reexamined for what Defoe's precursor narratives render so clearly: the new novel as a form of narrative exists precisely in its complicated relationship to ideas and issues that are more than personal. We can locate the novel's discourse as occurring at the intersection of popular or demotic journalism and the serious periodical essay; the novel can be defined often enough as a dialogue between personalized expressivity and older forms of "objective" discourse, or, to put it more simply, between an interest in important or pressing ideas and issues for their own sake and an appropriation or exploitation of ideas to project those verbal energies and accents that signify novelistic character at its fullest and most complicated.
As my choice of terms to characterize novelistic essence makes clear, I
do not fully accept recent nominalistic trends in the study of the eighteenthcentury English novel that avoid value judgments and offer neutral cultural analysis in which the canonized few are brought down to the level of the neglected many, with all novels reduced to the status of rivals in the cultural arena of the new print market or the proto-modem world of emerging mass media. I do, nonetheless, admire the main exponent of this view, William Warner, in Licensing Entertainment (1998) , and think that his notion that the moral novel of mid-century is a defensive reaction against the erotic and hedonistic indulgence of the female amatory novel is almost exactly right. Warner is shrewdly concerned with tracing the gradual institutionalizing of the novel: "by becoming the object and occasion for criticism, selected novels become more than a vehicle of leisure entertainmentthey come to be valued as a literary genre, objectified as 'the novel.' "2 But what he tends to treat as an unfortunate moralistic and repressive highcultural reaction against wayward popular energies (a submerged value judgment that is frequently on offer in revisionist histories of the novel that attack the canonical masters of the genre as part of a rearguard cultural repression), I see as the addition of complexity and value, of intellectual and aesthetic weight, of cognitive significance to affective and expressive power. Warner's approach is only minimally historical and nothing less than social scientific in its disengagement from intellectual or moral value.
He speaks in rather mechanistic and deliberately anachronistic terms of the "elevation of novels ... by Defoe, Aubin, Richardson, and Fielding, as a creative early modern response by media workers and entertainers to the onset of market-driven culture" (p. xiii).
Having actually read and pondered much English fiction beyond the canonical few produced from 1660 to 1739, 1 continue to insist on the generic originality and intellectual/aesthetic power (of various kinds, to be sure) of the line that begins with Defoe and flourishes in Richardson, Fielding, Smollett, Steme, and Bumey and that is not fully achieved by other eighteenth-century novelists. (Can we really call them "media workers"? What exactly, except a flattening effect, is gained by such terms?) The powerful and diverse originality of the canonical novelists lies very precisely in the moral/intellectual density of their narratives. Such density is both explicit-an overt engagement with specific issues and controversies of the day-and implicit-a staging through narrative enactment of notions about social and institutional stmctures: the force of personal agency, and the nature of moral and divine law in relation to that agency, to name their most obvious intellectual implications. Such concerns, in the final analysis, are a matter of energetic articulation that operates for the most part by complicated dramatization rather than overt statement. Of course, an interest in ideas and overt rendition of them guarantees nothing in itself. There are bad and boring novels of ideas, both then and now, and anyone who has tried to read, say, Henry Brooke's The Fool of Quality or Ayn Rand's The Fountainhead can testify to that. Each novel's engagement with ideas and issues needs, naturally, to be judged on its own, but I submit that intellectual ambition and thoughtfulness are in one way or another signs of potential value in fiction.
In rigid framework, to which the hero has no access from within and which is part of the authorial consciousness defining and representing him-and is presented against the firm background of the external world.4
In the monological world, says Bakhtin later, "tertium non datur: a thought is either affirmed or repudiated; otherwise it simply ceases to be a fully valid thought" (p. 80). In such a world, an unaffirmed thought if it is to "enter into the artistic stmcture, must be deprived in general of its power to mean, must become a psychical fact" (p. 80). So for Bakhtin an idea represented artistically is not simply expressive of personality (like Don Quixote's deluded notions about the magical world of romantic knight errantry); such an idea has to have validity as an idea and not just as a projection or expression of this or that person. Dostoevsky's novels take us, Bakhtin says, beyond the positivistic (monological) world of mere affirmation or repudiation in which the author presides over the secondary tmth of personality from the heights of absolute truth and into a world of dialogicity: "There can be [in Dostoevsky's works] no firm image of the hero answering to the question, 'Who is he?' The only questions here are 'Who am I?' and 'Who is he?' But even these questions reverberate in a continuous and open-ended interior dialogue ... Authorial discourse cannot encompass the hero and his word on all sides, cannot lock in and finalize him from without. It can only address itself to him. All definitions and all points of view are swallowed up by dialogue, drawn into its becoming" (p. 251). Where the monological world is fixed, final, stable, and neutral, the diaological world is in a state of radical process: "Whatever is firm, dead, finished, unable to respond, whatever has already spoken its final word, does not exist in Dostoevsky's world" (p. 251). To my mind, Bakhtin's evocation of "monologic design" describes something like the assumptions governing those narrative moments that are an essential feature of the eighteenth-century periodical essay and much eighteenth-century fiction for that matter. Addison, for the most obvious example, begins The Spectator with the interesting observation that a reader "seldom pemses a book with pleasure, 'till he knows whether the writer of it be a black or a fair Man, of a mild or cholerick Disposition, Married or a Bachelor, with other Particulars of the like nature, that conduce very much to the right Understanding of an Author."5 Whatever the tmth about the vulgar curiosity of eighteenth-century readers concerning the identity of authors, Mr Spectator violates his own principle by revealing in fact very little about himself. He is a purely rhetorical device, and the character of the spectator merely a fiction meant to serve Addison's purposes. Although readers do leam a few things about Mr Spectatorthat he has visited Grand Cairo and travelled through France and Italy-his personality and character are summed up in his silence and unobtrasiveness, and his self-consciousness (such as it is) is a device for efficient observation of the social and moral world encompassed by the other members of the Club. In those essays when Addison or Steele or Budgell or Hughes speaks on literary, moral, or social topics without the dramatic device of the Club (especially, of course, Sir Roger de Coverley), an authoritative and more or less impersonal voice takes over, but the difference between that voice and the dramatically inflected accents of Mr Specator is not really significant. But the most interesting (I want to call them proto-novelistic) moments occur when Mr Spectator and Sir Roger engage in dialogue that is both explicit and implicit. Here is one example (Spectator 1 17), part of a sequence in which the Spectator is visiting Sir Roger in the country. The subject is witchcraft, and Mr Spectator considers it in his opening paragraph as one of those "Opinions in which a Man should stand Neuter, without engaging his Assent to one side or the other." This neutrality, he says, is "absolutely necessary in a Mind that is carefull to avoid Errors and Prepossessions" (1:479). Mr Spectator's judicious neutrality derives from his historical and sociological sophistication, and in his explanation his neutrality becomes a form of practical agnosticism and social/intellectual progressivism: Mr Spectator goes on to explain that these reflections are the result of his meeting a poor old woman while walking in the country with Sir Roger, who explains that she "had the Reputation of a Witch all over the Country."
At Mr Spectator's insistence they visit Moll White in her hovel, and, while Sir Roger winks and points to the tools of her trade (a broomstick and a tabby cat), the Spectator is "secretly concerned to see Human Nature in so much Wretchedness and Disgrace, but at the same time could not forbear smiling to hear Sir Roger ... advising her as a Justice of Peace to avoid all Communication with the Devil, and never to hurt any of her Neighbours Cattle" (1:482).
Moderate, compassionate, and enlightened, Mr Spectator's ideas about witchcraft are distinguished from Sir Roger's kindly ignorance, which is amusing but ineffectual and potentially destmctive in co-operating with popular and widespread superstition and persecution: "there is scarce a Village in England that has not a Moll White in it," and poor, senile old women are turned into witches as the whole country is filled "with extravagant Fancies, imaginary Distempers, and terrifying Dreams. ... This frequently cut off Charity from the greatest Objects of Compassion, and inspires People with a Malevolence towards those poor decrepid Parts of our Species, in whom Human Nature is defaced by Infirmity and Dotage" (1:482). As Donald F. Bond's note points out, Addison's paper appeared shortly before the trial on 4 March 1712 of Jane Wenham at Hertford, the last person in England to be convicted of witchcraft and sentenced to death for it (she was reprieved and pardoned, as it turns out, 1:480). So Mr Spectator's musings are both personal and public; witchcraft and other manifestations of the supernatural were important, indeed pressing, topics of the day. But his neutrality is a form of intellectual authority, and his experience in the country with Sir Roger is of course a set-up, designed to allow this discussion and to dramatize Mr Spectator's brand of moderate rationality and to place it against popular superstition and thoughtless acquiescence in cmel customs. Sir Roger and Mr Spectator are not in trae dialogue but rather one-sided conversation, although there is an implicit dialogue of an affirmative kind and a tacit agreement about appropriate intellectual and moral positioning between Mr Spectator and the judicious reader. This paper can be taken as in some sense exemplary of what happens in the narrative parts of the eighteenth-century periodical essay, where some characters like Sir Roger are immersed in their circumstances and either comically or more seriously can never acquire distance from them and generalizable knowledge about them. In Bakhtin's terms, this is a monological world where (despite Mr Spectator's technical neutrality on this issue) certain positions can be affirmed and other positions such as Sir Roger's credulity become psychical facts and sociocultural circumstances understood within that secondary world of personality over which the narrator presides. Mr Spectator can talk to Sir Roger but dialogue in the full sense of the term is not really an option. This is an extreme example of the monological condition, and we might want to generalize by saying that in the periodical essay from Addison and Steele to Johnson this sort of powerfully implicit authorial presence is pervasive and absolute, with the author necessarily and properly superior in knowledge and understanding to whichever characters he chooses to devise and to engage with. All the members ofthe Club in the Spectator are devices for delivering ideas, and the same can be said of those less vivid characters who appear in the Rambler and the Idler. To be sure, the personalities who make appearances in the periodical essay are part and parcel of the ideas they offer readers, and their partialities and prejudices are offered by the essayist as implicit critiques of the ideas or intellectual positions they hold. In an obvious but I think neglected sense, what separates the periodical essay from what we now think of as the novel in the eighteenth century is the relative integrity and independence granted to characters, who are allowed to speak, as it were, in their own distinctive voices and within their defining intellectual and moral positions, however misguided and even comically foolish or deluded they may be, and thereby to posit a challenging subjectivity that engages with readers (and for that matter in some sense with the authors who conceived them) in a situation which resembles even it does not fully realize Bakhtinian dialogicity.
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For an interesting example of a character in a periodical essay (written at the end of the decade we now associate with the full flowering of the new novel) who speaks powerfully and insistently but some of whose utterances are couched so as to dramatize their foolishness and their defining power of self-expression, consider Rhodoclia in Johnson's Rambler 62 (20 October 1750). Her story is a scenario for many an eighteenthcentury novel to come. Bom in the country to parents who have retired there out of disappointment in court and city, she writes of them to the Rambler: "They had not much reason to regret the change of their situation; for their vanity, which had so long been tormented by neglect and disappointment, was here gratified with every honour that could be paid them. Their long familiarity with publick life made them the oracles of all those who aspired to intelligence, or politeness. My father dictated politicks, my mother prescribed the mode, and it was sufficient to entitle any family to some consideration, that they were known to visit at Mrs. Courtley's."6 Rhodoclia describes how her parents' evocations of their younger days in London have now made her uneasy. She wishes herself "nearer to those places where every hour brings some new pleasure, and life is diversified with an unexhausted succession of felicity" (p. 332). Recently, she continues, a visit to the country by a young gentleman and his sister has fired her desire for the city's pleasures, and she is "resolved to be no longer buried in ignorance and obscurity, but to share with other wits the joy of being admired, and divide with other beauties the empire of the world" (p. 333). Until that day, she urges the Rambler to "alleviate the misery of delay" by writing pleasing descriptions of the town. If he fails to provide them, she wams him that he will "lose the honour of being read by those eyes which are now intent only on conquest and destruction" (p. 334). As Johnson fashions this young lady's writing, it has ironic strength and comic symmetry in its evocation of the lives of her self-satisfied provincial parents, but of course her discourse is also self-deluded in its extravagant renditions of the imagined pleasures of life in the town. The simple comedy here depends on the reader's superior knowledge of the complexity of life in the city, but, as always in Johnson, there is a guiding respect for the implicit moral power of rhetorical formulation, and Rhodoclia can be taken as a potentially complex character who has failed to draw the proper conclusions from her satiric diagram of her parents' self-satisfied existence. Johnson's style lends strenuous generality and stylistic muscularity to even a conventional and at first glance insubstantial figure such as this young Aside from the conventional, perennial opposition between country and city, there is nothing particularly urgent about the ideas in this Rambler essay. I choose it because it seems to me to mark an overlap between novel and essay, between the sketchy exploration of the deformations of character that accompany female leisure-class rural life as it feeds upon fantasies of sex and class movement and a fully articulated narrative that dramatizes such matters in specific detail. Johnson's silence, in this essay and others like it, grants the character he impersonates an energy and independence that almost make her more than an instance of the enthusiastic young provincial female longing for passionate experience in the metropolis. Generality and typicality such as Johnson invokes massively when writing in propria persona as the Rambler are temporarily (or perhaps only potentially and superficially) effaced in the evocation of Rhodoclia. That effacement may be said to mark a small advance in terms of novelistic dialogicity from Mr Spectator's use of Sir Roger in the paper on witchcraft. One can imagine a novelist (not Johnson!) elaborating Rhodoclia's desires and making her ideas about urban life an expression of her life history, the intensity of those ideas, their transmutation into extravagant desires and fantasies, grounded in the histories of her parents and her relationship to them and their personalities and experiences.
In her imperious desires and in her linguistic cleverness, Rhodoclia resembles some of the memorable women Pope evoked years before in his "Epistle to a Lady: On the Characters of Women" (1735), but in the frankness, the articulate and socially ambitious aggressiveness of her desires, she can be distinguished from the reluctant and modest heroines of countless novellas and novels of female amatory initiation. The early eighteenth-century amatory novella, as exemplified by the works of the prolific Eliza Haywood during her most productive decade, the 1720s, fills out one part of the antithesis I am working with: these novellas are remarkable since they are to a large extent pure evocations of emotional intensities, untainted by any interest in ideas or in public or political issues; the heroines are visited by overwhelming and ineffable (and intensely private and nearly unrepresentable) passion, obsessions that preclude selfexamination and make a mockery of agency and self-consciousness. Theirs is a monological universe but with a different frame of reference from the periodical essay; in place of that tacit agreement between author and initiated and knowing reader, that understanding whereby in some sense everything is always already understood or treated as such, the amatory novella substitutes another regulatory idea: the tragically exciting inevitability of obsessive passion, of an essentialist recurrence in amatory relationships between men and women (of a certain class, to be sure), who conform over and over again to types and patterns of desire, he pursuing and insatiable, she pursued and always entranced and nearly always destroyed. True dialogue in Bakhtin's sense seems not to be the issue in the Haywoodian novella, since male speech is false and manipulative and female speaking is more or less involuntary and absolutely inadequate to express passionate intensity. To be sure, garrulous lovers speak to one another incessantly in these novellas, but their speech works mainly to arouse each other and not incidentally the reader; their speech has communicative and expressive value but no cognitive significance. Although the novellas depict tumultuous emotions and often disastrous and fatal encounters, this flux is absolutely predictable, erotic fireworks that inevitably destroy the heroines and arouse willing readers, producing excitement and pity every single time according to a formula designed to work and to sell books to an eager public.
But let me illustrate and also test the finality of this description by using one of Haywood's most restrained and decorous novellas, The British Recluse (1722), which is technically one long dialogue between two women who meet in a suburban London lodging house. Belinda, "a young lady of a considerable Fortune in Warwickshire," comes to London on unspecified business and discovers living in retirement in this house a beautiful young woman known as "the recluse" by her fellow lodgers. Belinda hears Cleomira's story of passionate obsession, her abandonment and betrayal by Lysander, and her attempted suicide when he spurns her. Love when it comes to Cleomira is a passion of which she claims, amazingly, to be totally ignorant: "I had so little Notion of [it] ," she tells Belinda as she begins her story, "that I considered it no more than a Fiction and only dressed up by the Poets in such variety of Shapes to make the Amusement more entertaining"7 As she recounts it, her first glimpse of Lysander is electrifying and the results immediate and absolutely irresistible. When he arrives at a ball, he is pointed out to her by another young lady: While she was speaking, I directed my Eyes where I perceived she looked and saw a Form which appeared more than Man and nothing inferior to those Ideas we conceive of Angels; his Air! his Shape! his Face! were more than HumanMyriads of lightning Glories darted from his Eyes as he cast them round the Room yet tempered with such a streaming Sweetness! Such a descending Softness as The narrator begins by claiming that this is a cautionary tale meant to warn lovers to "depend on nothing but what we had Proof for" (p. 155). Since love "is one of the first Passions for which the Soul finds Room, so it is also the most easily deceived." The narrator introduces the tale as a "sad Example" of this credulity, but what happens to Cleomira initially in her rendition of love and its effects is not the result merely of her credulity and her innocence but of an erotic attraction that operates for innocent young women as irresistible destiny, as a psycho-sexual inevitability. The moral utility of the tale, obviously, is irrelevant, and the actual purpose of the novella is not to explore the complexities of female psycho-sexuality but to dramatize their thrilling simplicities for erotic and pathetic purposes.
What follows is a story that rehearses Lysander's glib seduction strategies, a torrent of flatulent amatory rhetoric that has its desired effect and to that extent illustrates the dangers of female credulity. But credulity is very much the secondary effect of erotic attraction. And in Belinda's story, once Cleomira has concluded hers, we find proof of a sort that love operates invariably in female hearts, for Belinda has also been smitten by Lysander, seduced at the first sight of him away from her betrothed, the aptly named Worthly, who excites esteem and friendship but not love.
But a cmcial moment in Cleomira's seduction and perhaps an unsuspected complexity in the tale's rendition of female personality occurs when she arranges to see Lysander after the ball, this time from a window that faces the highway. As Haywood presents the scene, there is an ingenuousness in her heroine, a young woman's unselfconscious fascination with fashion details and the perfection of glossy surfaces that can be read as an implicit (pp. 169-70) . This exactly observed fashion report is accompanied by Cleomira's claim that it would be "fruitless" to attempt "to represent what 'twas I felt!" (p. 170). So next to recurrent invocations ofthat ancient rhetorical tum, the "inexpressibility topos" (as Ernst Robert Curtius called it),8 whereby words fail necessarily to do justice, in this case, to the mystery and intensity of love, and Cleomira can only appeal to Belinda's own knowledge through experience of the "Power of Love" (p. 167), there exists in Cleomira's discourse a very exact and enthusiastically fluent rendition of the surface particularities and specifically determining circumstances of sexual attraction-Lysander's physical charms but also his skill at fashionable dressing and up-to-the-minute selfpresentation. Cleomira seems in a moment like this to understand pretty precisely Lysander's attractiveness, and indeed as a narrator she is never at a loss for words except when it comes to explaining the nature of love. But she is expert at rendering its circumstances and implicitly derives its intensity and in effect cancels or at least modifies its unknowability from those circumstances. In Bakhtin's terms, we might want to say that Haywood's tale places in revealing dialogue in a moment like this the formulaic and conventional notion of a woman's speechless expression of psychosexual destiny with the specific and historically localized expressivity of a conventional object of female desire as experienced in a love novella published in 1722. The emotional confusion and ethical turbulence that love brings heroines such as Cleomira and Belinda in the amatory novella cancel agency and preclude consideration of other issues and topics, but in fact express clearly enough a position on female vulnerability to cultural constructs surrounding the idea of love and female destiny at a particular historical and social moment. There is, in a sense, a dialogue between the ostensible moral and psychological purpose of the tale, to warn young female readers of the dangers of love, and the actual effect of the tale's elaborations of the mysterious and destructive force of love, which illustrate how attraction works which is part and parcel of their profile. At its most interesting and culturally dense, such fiction may be said to offer neither the controlled and compromised dialogicism of the periodical essay nor the darkly implicit and subversive double voicing to be found occasionally in the amatory novella. The best and most revealing incident of dialogism in nearly the full Bakhtinian sense that I know in early eighteenth-century fiction is Cmsoe's dialogue with himself about the cannibals, to which I referred earlier.
As every reader vividly recalls, Cmsoe's serene possession of his island is shattered by the discovery of the single footprint, and it is not until two years later that the mystery is solved when he finds the remains of a cannibal feast. Physical disgust (Crusoe vomits violently, almost passing out, as he surveys the human barbecue pit) is followed by intense thoughtfulness: "I entertained such an abhorrence of the savage wretches that I have been speaking of, and of the wretched inhuman custom of their devouring and eating one another up, that I continued pensive and sad, and kept close within my own circle for almost two years after this" (p. 173). These thoughts distract Crusoe, he tells us, from a project that comes into his head to brew beer from his barley, as night and day he can "think of nothing but how I might destroy some of these monsters in their cruel bloody entertainment, and, if possible, save the victim they should bring hither to destroy" (p. 175). Even though he realizes the odds are against him, Crusoe broods upon how he might accomplish this destmction of the cannibals, going so far as to prepare his ammunition and position his muskets for an ambush. What Cmsoe records in these pages are the alterations in his passions and thoughts that time and his isolation bring for him, and the internal debate that will ensue is remarkable in grounding ideas in time and personal circumstances and indeed in deriving his versions of those ideas exactly from his circumstances and in tracing Cmsoe's eventual awareness of those determinants. He not only thinks but dramatizes the conditions of thought, narrates the function of thinking within his personal development, and defines himself as a mind making its way through a series of positions, each of which has a distinct validity and personal Tightness for him at different points in his experience. Or in Bakhtin's terms we might want to say that he locates his personality at the intersection of competing explanations, rational, emotional, historical, political, of cannibalism, with his own personal situation as the lone European inhabitant of the island.
But now, when, as I have said, I began to be weary of the fruitless excursion, which I had made so long, and so far, every morning in vain, so my opinion of the action realization that he has been lucky in settling on that part of the island where the cannibals do not pay their visits, his constant anxiety for several years after his first sighting of the remains of one of their feasts that they will encounter him by accident, his dreams after he actually witnesses one of their feasts of killing many of them-in short, Cmsoe's narrative balances his carefully thought out rational and moral insights (statements with real cognitive value, meaningful contributions as it were to contemporary moral and political debates about culture and empire) against the day-to-day climate of personal uncertainty and deep anxiety in which spontaneous emotions and uncontrollable apprehensions necessarily prevail or at the least modify particular intellectual positions. Thinking exists for Cmsoe in a vividly rendered context of experience and emotion, but thought as Crusoe experiences it in his isolation provides leisure for reflexive self-observation that is entirely of a piece with his empirical investigations of the island world. The final resolution Cmsoe comes to in this sequence of thinking hard about the cannibals is to observe without prejudging, to take no action except preparatory vigilance and patient watching for an advantage in the face of shifting and unpredictable phenomena. Note how in the following final account of his deliberations he evokes his conclusions as something observed rather than initiated; his bold plan a matter of purposeful waiting for opportunity, an activity that is essentially and paradoxically an active passivity, a shrewd and opportunistic deferral to circumstances. Thought in this context is qualified, as perhaps thought always is, by ideological need.
However, at last, after many secret disputes with my self, and after great perplexities about it, for all these arguments one way and another struggled in my head a long time, the eager prevailing desire of deliverance at length mastered all the rest; and I resolved, if possible, to get one of those savages into my hands, cost what it would. My next thing then was to contrive how to do it, and this indeed was very difficult to resolve on. But as I could pitch upon no probable means for it, so I resolved to put my self upon the watch, to see them when they came on shore, and leave the rest to the event, taking such measures as the opportunity should present, let be what would be. (p. 203) "Who am I?" (to recall Bakhtin's questions that the hero of the novel implicitly asks of himself) is inseparable from and simultaneous with the question, "Who is he?"-in this case the cannibal other, the presence that from the first haunts Cmsoe's Hobbesian imagination. In Cmsoe's dialogue with himself these questions are continually answered and modified, subject to the shifting pressures of experience and counter-pressures from rationality and moral-religious systems that Cmsoe invokes to counter his sophical opposite? Or are they simply a cultural other, something to be understood and managed for personal advantage? Unlike Cleomira's unselfconscious revelation of the culturally determined nature of her amatory obsession with Lysander, Cmsoe's debate with himself, a more intense version of his whole narrative, is a meditation on fate and motive and a dramatization of how both are conditioned by circumstances. Crusoe's dialogue within himself is pure dialogism, I think, in Bakhtin's sense. Positions are both cognitively and historically valid (relativistic, progressive) and self-expressive, valid in themselves and also true to the island moment and Cmsoe's changing circumstances year by year and moment by moment.
It would be hard to find another perfect example of dialogism in so brief a compass as this section ofRobinson Crusoe, and I am certainly not claiming that I can or that I have space in this essay to prove my point exhaustively. I think that the novels of Richardson (especially Clarissa) and Fielding (especially Tom Jones) and Smollett (pre-eminently Humphry Clinker) and Burney (both Evelina and Cecilia) have dialogical aspects and moments, for all of them in distinct ways locate personality like Defoe in thought as well as emotion, in intellectual encounters with social and moral ideas; all of their major characters engage with important contemporary issues and all of them in distinct ways confront the Bakhtinian double and dynamic question [Who am I? and Who is (s)he?] in richly particularized renditions in which idea and emotion intertwine productively and dialectically in the cognitive and expressive intermixture that defines the new novel. Questions of tmth and questions of virtue are indeed always implicitly posed by these books, but the answers offered are always rendered (in different ways) as situational and in fact provisional and local. This is not to say that these authors in any way surrendered their notions of the existence of absolute tmth and virtue (such a move is literally inconceivable to them), but rather that there is implicit in the new novel of the eighteenth century an occasional, sometimes only potential, dialogical energy that would come to full fmition and conscious articulation only in the next century's fiction.
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